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Abstract
In this paper we examine the following two hypotheses which traditional
theories of capital structure are relatively silent about: (i) the determinants
of financial leverage decisions are diﬀerent for micro, small, medium and large
firms; and (ii) the factors that determine whether or not a firm issues debt are
diﬀerent from those that determine how much debt it issues. Using a binary
choice model to explain the probability of a firm raising debt and a fractional
regression model to explain the relative amount of debt issued, we find strong
support for both hypotheses. Confirming recent empirical evidence, we find
also that, although larger firms are more likely to use debt, conditional on
having some debt firm size is negatively related to the proportion of debt
used by firms.
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1 Introduction
Ever since Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) pioneering contribution to the capital
structure literature, a key theme in corporate finance has been to identify the main
factors that aﬀect the financing decisions of firms. For many years, most theoret-
ical and empirical research on capital structure has focussed on large, listed firms.
However, it is widely recognized today by scholars and policymakers that small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) play a key role in economic and social development
throughout the world. In Europe, the increasing attention dedicated to their role
in the economy is clearly illustrated by the European Charter for Small Enterprises
approved by the European Union leaders in 2000, where it is recognized that ‘small
enterprises must be considered as a main driver for innovation, employment as well
as social and local integration’.1 In the European Union, in 2003, SMEs represented
99.8% of all enterprises and contributed about 69.7% of employment and 57.3% of
turnover (European Commission 2003).
Thus, in recent years there has been a substantial increment in the number
of empirical studies on SMEs’ debt policy decisions; see inter alia Cassar and
Holmes (2003), Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas (2004), Michaelas, Chittenden and
Poutziouris (1999), Sogorb-Mira (2005) and Watson and Wilson (2002). Similarly
to these authors, our main aim in this paper is to investigate whether and to what
extent traditional capital structure theories provide also a satisfactory account of
the capital structure choice of SMEs. In particular, we focus on the investigation of
the main determinants of the financial leverage of Portuguese firms. This is relevant
per se since, on the one hand, as shown by Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas (2004),
there are substantial variations in the eﬀects of the determinants of capital struc-
ture across countries and, on the other hand, there are only a few studies on the
Portuguese case (e.g. Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas 2004 and Pindado, Rodrigues
and de la Torre 2006). However, the contributions of this paper to the previous
literature on SMEs (and, in fact, for the capital structure literature in general) go
well beyond that.
First of all, as the data set that we use in this study comprises (using the new
definitions recently adopted by the European Commission) large, medium, small and
micro firms, we are able to make an integrated study and comparison of the main
determinants of the capital structure of each one of those four size-based groups. In
contrast, most previous studies on SMEs do not distinguish between micro, small
and medium firms, treating all SMEs as a unique, uniform group and, thus, ignoring
1The European Charter for Small Enterprises is available online at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/charter/docs/charter_en.pdf.
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that diﬀerent factors might aﬀect their capital structure choices in fundamentally
diﬀerent ways.2 Moreover, note that the micro firm group per se clearly deserves
a special attention. Indeed, according to European Commission (2003), within the
group of European SMEs, the vast majority (92.5%) are micro enterprises, which
contribute to 56.5% of the employment generated by SMEs. Similar patterns may
be found around the world. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no
studies on the capital structure of micro firms.3 Note also that most previous studies
on SMEs are based on data sets covering only SMEs, see Voulgaris, Asteriou and
Agiomirgianakis (2004) for an exception, which implies that all comparisons made
in those papers with large enterprises (LEs) capital structure decisions are based
on results for LEs described in other studies, which were obtained using other data
sources and, sometimes, other econometric methodologies and frequently are relative
to other countries and time spans.
The second major diﬀerence between our paper and other empirical analysis
of SMEs’ financing decisions concerns the econometric methodology employed. In
particular, we show that the standard practice of using linear regression models to
examine how a given set of potential explanatory variables influence some leverage
(debt to capital assets) ratio is not the most appropriate choice. Indeed, since, by
definition, a leverage ratio is observed only on the closed interval [0,1] and many
firms have null leverage ratios4, the eﬀect of any explanatory variable on leverage
ratios cannot be constant throughout its entire range. This is a critical issue since
misspecification of the functional form of a regression model leads to biased results.
However, this issue has attracted little attention in the capital structure empirical
literature hitherto; see, for example, Frank and Goyal (2008), which discuss several
econometric issues that may aﬀect the regression analysis of leverage ratios (e.g.
missing data, surviving bias, outliers) but ignore that the bounded nature of lever-
2The only exception to this practice seems to be Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias (2000), which
considered a partition of the SME group similar to ours but restricted their investigation to an
analysis of variance of the influence of size and business sector on the financial behaviour of firms.
There are also some recent papers which treat SMEs as a uniform group throughout most of the
analysis but include robustness tests on firm size, reestimating their main models for size-based
sub-samples (e.g. Cassar and Holmes 2003).
3Somewhat related papers to the study of the capital structure of micro firms are those examin-
ing the financing decisions of family business owners (e.g. Romano, Tanewski and Smyrnios 2001)
since many micro firms are indeed family businesses. However, many family businesses cannot be
classified as micro enterprises.
4Actually, there are two exceptions to this case: (i) some firms may have negative book values
of equity, implying leverage ratios higher than 1; however, such firms are typically excluded from
empirical studies on capital structures; and (ii) a small number of earlier applications focussed on
debt to equity ratios, which are not bounded from above; however, using linear regression models
to explain such ratios is still not appropriate since the (high) number of firms with null leverage
ratios remains the same.
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age ratios conditions crucially the range of approaches that should be adopted for
modelling them. In our empirical analysis we found that, although in terms of the
direction and significance of the regression coeﬃcients very similar conclusions were
achieved for both linear and more complex models, in terms of the magnitude of
the partial eﬀects estimated for each explanatory variable the diﬀerences may be
substantial.
Given that methodologically it is not correct to use linear models for explaining
leverage ratios, the empirical analysis undertaken in the paper is based on the (non-
linear) fractional regression model developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) for
continuously measured proportions with a finite number of boundary observations
(i.e. 0s and 1s). As this model takes explicitly into account the restrictions on the
values of leverage ratios, it could be directly applied to our data. However, based on
a preliminary analysis of our data and on recent findings by Cassar (2004), Faulk-
ender and Petersen (2006), Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007) and Strebulaev and Yang
(2007), we decided to develop and apply a two-part fractional regression model that
treats separately the decision of issuing debt or not and, conditional on this deci-
sion, the decision on the quantity of debt to issue. Indeed, when we first examined
the data, we found a very interesting fact: while the proportion of firms that do
not use debt financing is higher for micro firms, conditional on having debt this is
also the group of firms that present the largest average leverage ratio. Moreover, in
both cases small firms are ranked in second place, medium firms in third and large
firms in fourth. Clearly, as this suggests that the factors that determine whether
or not a firm uses debt at all may be diﬀerent from the factors that determine how
much debt are used by firms that do use debt, it seemed more realistic to allow the
explanatory variables to influence in independent ways each decision. Therefore, in
our empirical analysis the first decision is modelled as a binary choice model and the
second as a fractional regression model that explains the relative amount of debt is-
sued conditional upon the decision to issue debt. To the best of our knowledge, only
Cassar (2004) and Cook, Kieschnick and McCullough (2004) have also used separate
models to explain those decisions. However, they employed a diﬀerent econometric
methodology.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly
review some capital structure theories and the main empirical hypotheses that are
implied by them for the leverage decisions of firms. Section 3 describes the data set
used in our study and formulates the two main hypotheses that are examined in this
paper. Section 4 explains the econometric methodology applied to the data. Section
5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes the
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paper.
2 Standard determinants of capital structure
2.1 Alternative theories
Three of the most popular explanations of capital structure are the trade-oﬀ, the
agency costs, and the pecking-order theories. Below we give a brief overview of each
one of these theories; for more details see the recent surveys by Frank and Goyal
(2008) and Prasade, Green and Murinde (2005).
The trade-oﬀ theory (TOT) claims the existence of an optimal capital structure
that firms have to reach in order to maximize their value. The focus of this theory is
on the benefits and costs of debt. The former include essentially the tax deductibility
of interest paid (Modigliani and Miller 1958), while the latter are originated by an
excessive amount of debt and the consequent potential bankruptcy costs (Kraus and
Litzenberger 1973). Thus, firms set a target level for their debt-equity ratio that
balances the tax advantages of additional debt against the costs of possible financial
distress and bankruptcy.
The agency costs theory (ACT), initiated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), states
that the optimal capital structure of each firm depends on the value of debt that
mitigates the conflicts between stockholders and managers, on the one hand, and
stockholders and debtholders, on the other hand. According to this theory, the
stockholder-manager agency costs of free cash-flow push firms towards more debt
in order to reduce the ‘free’ cash at managers’ disposal (Jensen 1986), while the
stockholder-debtholder agency costs of underinvestment and asset substitution push
firms towards less leverage since large debt levels may be an incentive for reject-
ing value-increasing projects (Myers 1977) and pursuing risky projects (Jensen and
Meckling 1976).5
The pecking-order theory (POT), which was originally developed byMyers (1984)
and Myers and Majluf (1984), on the other hand, argues that firms do not possess an
optimal capital structure although the financing decisions of their managers are not
irrelevant for their value. Indeed, due to information asymmetries between firms’
managers and potential outside financiers, which limit access to outside finance,
firms tend to adopt a perfect hierarchical order of financing: first, they use internal
5Note that some authors consider the ACT as a part of the TOT since it focusses also on
the benefits and costs of debt. However, in contrast to tax-based and bankruptcy theories, which
are inter-dependent, the ACT originates a complete theory of capital structure, so we opted for
considering it separately.
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funds (retained earnings); in case external financing is needed, they issue low-risk
debt; only as a last resort, when the firm exhausts its ability to issue safe debt, are
new shares issued. In the absence of investment opportunities, firms retain earnings
and build up financial slack to avoid having to raise external finance in the fu-
ture. Hence, the firm leverage at each moment merely reflects its external financing
requirements without a tendency to revert to any particular capital structure.
2.2 General empirical hypotheses
The three capital structure theories just described allow the identification of various
factors as determinants of a firm’s capital structure choice. Based on them, we next
formulate a number of hypotheses for firms’ financing decisions which are standard in
the financial literature. In each case, we indicate briefly which and why a particular
theory claims such behaviour, and provide some references where more detailed
argumentation can be found.
1. Non-debt tax shields are negatively related to debt. Tax deduction for depreci-
ation and investment tax credits act as substitutes for the tax benefits of debt,
which implies that a firm with a large non-debt tax shield is likely to be less
leveraged (TOT - DeAngelo and Masulis 1980).
2. Tangibility is positively related to debt. Firms with a greater percentage of
their total assets composed of tangible assets have a higher capacity for rais-
ing debt since, in case of liquidation, these assets keep their value (TOT -
Myers 1977). In firms with large tangible assets and poor cash-flows, stock-
holders may be better oﬀ by liquidating current operations; as managers may
always want to continue the firm’s current operations, debt can be considered
a mechanism to increase default probability and give debt-holders the option
to force liquidation (ACT - Harris and Raviv 1990). Due to asymmetric infor-
mation, it is easier for the lender to establish the value of tangible assets, so
firms with larger proportion of tangible assets have better access to the debt
market (POT).
3. Size is positively related to debt. Larger firms tend to be more diversified, so
their probability of bankruptcy is relatively smaller; moreover, large firms are
more likely to have a credit rating and, thus, access to non-bank debt financing
(TOT - Warner 1977). As informational asymmetries are less severe for larger
firms, they find it easier to raise debt (POT - Myers, 1984).
4. Profitability is:
6
(a) positively related to debt. The higher the profitability of the firm, the
higher the tax advantages of using debt and the less the probability of
failing its interest payments (TOT) and the higher the free cash flows of
the firm and the agency costs of equity, so a higher level of debt should
be used to discipline the behaviour of management (ACT - Jensen and
Meckling 1976).
(b) negatively related to debt. The more profitable the firm, the greater the
availability of internal capital, the less the need for external funds (POT
- Myers 1984).
5. Expected growth is:
(a) negatively related to debt. As financial distress is more costly for firms
with large expected growth prospects, firms may be reluctant to take on
large amounts of debt in order to not increase their bankruptcy probabil-
ity (TOT - Myers 1984). Firms with more investment opportunities have
less need for the disciplining eﬀect of debt payments to control free cash
flows (ACT - Jensen 1986).
(b) positively related to debt. Firms with more investment opportunities bor-
row more since their probability of outrunning internally generated funds
is larger (POT - Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999).
6. Age is:
(a) positively related to debt. The longer the firm’s history of repaying its
debt, the lower will be its borrowing cost since lenders believe firms will
not engage in asset substitution projects (ACT - Diamond 1989).
(b) negatively related to debt. Older firms tend to accumulate retained earn-
ings and, thus, require less external finance (POT - Petersen and Rajan
1994).
7. Liquidity is negatively related to debt. If firms prefer internal sources of finance,
they tend to create liquid reserves from retained earnings in order to finance
future investments, which reduces their need for external funds (POT - Myers
and Majluf 1984).
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3 Data and main hypotheses of the paper
In this section we first describe the data set used in our study and then formulate
two further hypotheses which the three theories of capital structure considered above
are relatively silent about.
3.1 Sample and variables
The data used in this study were provided by the Banco de Portugal Central Balance
Sheet Data Oﬃce (CBSDO). From the CBSDO database we drew some information
about balance sheets, income statements and other characteristics of many non-
financial Portuguese firms for the year 1999.6 In order to eliminate firms which
were temporarily unoperational, or in the very early or very late stages of business
operations, we discarded all firms with zero sales (15 firms) or negative earnings
before interest, taxes and depreciation (283).7 Firms with negative equity and 4
huge outliers were also excluded. This selection criteria produced a final sample of
4692 firms.
Similarly to Sogorb-Mira (2005), we use the definitions of micro, small, medium
and large firms adopted by the European Commission (recommendation 2003/361/EC).
Thus, the category of SMEs consists of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 per-
sons and have either an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euros, or an annual
balance sheet total not exceeding 43 million euros. Within this group, small enter-
prises are defined as firms which employ fewer than 50 persons and whose annual
turnover or annual balance sheet total does not exceed 10 million euros. Finally,
micro enterprises are defined as firms which employ fewer than 10 persons and whose
annual turnover or annual balance sheet total does not exceed 2 million euros. Panel
A of Table 1 contains the breakdown of our sample by firm size.
Table 1 about here
In this paper we use as measure of financial leverage the ratio of long-term
debt (LTD) to long-term capital assets (defined as the sum of LTD and equity); see
6Most authors argue that the capital structure of financial corporations must be analyzed
separately because their financial responsibilities are not strictly comparable with those of other
firms; see for example Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1424).
7In the latter case, another reason lead us to exclude such firms. As described in Table 2, our
regression model uses the ratio between depreciation and negative earnings before interest, taxes
and depreciation (EBITDA) as a proxy for non-debt tax shields (NDTS). Since the inclusion of
firms with negative earnings would create a discontinuity in the NDTS measure at zero euros of
EBITDA, we opted for discarding such firms (see Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 1992, p. 253, footnote
9, for a similar procedure in a diﬀerent context).
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Rajan and Zingales (1995) for an extensive discussion on these and other alternative
measures of leverage. LTD is defined as the total company’s debt due for repayment
beyond one year. We use book values of both LTD and equity since our sample
comprises mostly unlisted firms. We consider only LTD because the main focus of
all (general) capital structure theories is the option that firms make between LTD
and equity to finance their businesses. As our aim in this paper is to investigate
whether those theories apply to all size-based groups of firms, we do not consider all
the other possible financing alternatives of firms such as short-term debt and trade
credit, which tend to be less important for larger firms.
As most of the factors that appear in the seven hypotheses formulated in section
2.2 correspond to unobservable theoretical attributes, in the econometric analysis
undertaken later in the paper we use some explanatory variables that work as proxies
for those attributes. The ones that we chose, which have been widely used in the
empirical literature, are described in Table 2. We also made some experiments
with other proxies but the results obtained will not be reported since they were
very similar.8 Some descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are reported
in Table 3. Since evidence from previous studies is mixed as to whether industry
membership aﬀects significantly firms’ capital structure, see inter alia Jordan, Lowe
and Taylor (1998) and Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas (2000) for opposite findings
regarding this issue, all the regressions performed in the paper include industry
controls in order to ensure that our findings are not significantly aﬀected by industry
membership.9
Table 2 about here
Table 3 about here
3.2 Firm size and debt financing
Originally, the three theories of capital structure reviewed in section 2.1 were for-
mulated to explain the observed practices of large, publicly traded corporations;
as pointed out by Ang (1991), they were not developed with small business in
mind. However, there has been an increasing recognition in the financial literature
8In particular, alternatively to the explanatory variables described in Table 2, we considered the
following proxies: the ratio between tangible assets and total assets for the attribute "Tangibility",
the natural logarithm of assets for "Size", the ratios between net income and assets and earnings
before interest, taxes and depreciation and assets for "Profitability", and the percentage change in
sales for "Growth".
9Due to data limitations, we considered only five categories of industries: Manufacturing (2905
firms), Construction (879), Wholesale and Retail Trade (124), Transport and Communication
(455), and Other Industries (329).
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that SMEs act diﬀerently and are aﬀected diﬀerently from large firms in numerous
aspects of their financial behaviour. For example, Ang (1992) states that ‘small
businesses (...) have diﬀerent types of complexities, such as shorter expected life,
presence of estate tax, intergenerational transfer problems, and prevalence of im-
plicit contracts’, while Scherr and Hulburt (2001) argues that ‘small firms diﬀer
from large firms in taxability, ownership, flexibility, industry, economies of scale,
financial market access, and level of information asymmetry’; see also Ang (1991)
and Pettit and Singer (1985).
Thus, given that ‘smaller firms are not larger firms scaled down’ (Scherr and
Hulburt 2001), there are many recent studies of capital structure that diﬀerentiate
between SMEs and LEs. In fact, there seem to be various theoretical reasons why
traditional capital structure theories may not apply directly to (at least the small-
est size-based sub-groups of) SMEs. In particular, asymmetric information and
agency problems are much more complex in the case of small businesses. Indeed,
the asymmetric information problem is more serious in SMEs given the informa-
tional opacity that characterizes most of them: for example, in general, SMEs do
not enter into contracts that are publicly visible or widely reported in the press, do
not issue traded securities that are continuously priced in public markets and do not
have audited financial statements that can be shared with any provider of outside
finance (Berger and Udell 1998; see also Ang 1991). With regard to agency prob-
lems, in small businesses, as the managers are also the owners in many cases, while
the stockholder-manager agency costs tend to be insignificant, agency problems be-
tween owners/managers and debtholders can be more severe due to the closely held
nature of small firms (and the consequent added flexibility of changing the asset
base and greater opportunity of owners/managers to consume perquisites and chan-
nel funds to themselves) and to the greater costs of dealing with them by means of
monitoring and bonding (e.g. Pettit and Singer 1985, Ang 1991, Chittenden, Hall
and Hutchinson 1996, Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris 1999).
As a consequence of these aggravated debtholder-manager agency and asymmet-
ric information problems, which aﬀect the cost and availability of credit, SMEs tend
to use less external funding than large firms. Indeed, in general, SMEs have no
access to equity and public debt markets and have to depend on financial interme-
diaries, particularly commercial banks, which may not be willing to provide them
all the funding they would like and usually impose higher interest rates and require
collateral (Berger and Udell 1995). This reasoning lead to the ‘finance gap theory’,
which states that the heavy reliance of SMEs on internal sources of finance is exter-
nally imposed, being the result of an institutional failure in providing them with an
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adequate amount of finance (e.g. Holmes and Kent 1991).
The recognition of the existence of gaps in the supply of finance for small firms
led to the development of alternative capital structure theories, which were designed
specifically for small firms. One of those theories is the financial bootstrapping the-
ory, which explains how, given the limitations faced on their supplies of finance,
small firms develop alternate means of acquiring and securing the use of resources
without borrowing money or raising equity financing from traditional sources. Ex-
amples of those alternate sources of funding for small firms are loans from friends
and relatives, credit cards, home equity loans, life insurance, supplier credit, leases
and costumer financing; see Van Auken and Neeley (1996) for more details and
many useful references regarding this subject. Other related theory to the finance
gap theory is the financing life-cycle approach, which suggests that the type of fi-
nancing alternatives available to firms varies through the life of the business (Ang
1991, Vos and Forlong 1996, Berger and Udell 1998). According to this theory,
small businesses may be thought of as having a financial growth cycle in which fi-
nancial options change as the firm grows and becomes less informationally opaque:
smaller/younger/more opaque firms must rely mainly on initial insider finance; if
they remain in existence and continue to grow, they are likely to be able to make
use of other sources of funds such as trade credit and bank loans; eventually, they
will gain access to public debt and equity markets.
While the theories just discussed are supply side in nature, alternative explana-
tions that focus on the demand side and stress the influence of the entrepreneur on
the predominance of internal sources of funding in the SME case are also popular.
According to this alternative view, even in the absence of debt supply constraints,
smaller firms would be less prone to use debt financing and more likely to use inter-
nal funds; see inter alia Hutchinson (1995), Vos and Forlong (1996) and Chandler
and Hanks (1998). Indeed, many small firms are family businesses that do not pur-
sue any high growth strategy and arguments like “being one’s own boss” may be
prominent in the entrepreneur’s objective function, which implies that such firms
may not need or wish to use debt financing. Actually, owners of small firms seem to
have a strong preference for those financing options that minimize intrusion in their
businesses and avoid the discipline inherent in other financing options than internal
funds. Therefore, retained earnings and personal savings lie in the first place of
their preference of financing and, in case internal funds are not enough, they will
prefer debt to outside equity mainly because debt means lower level of intrusion
and, hence, lower risk of losing control and decision-making power.
Therefore, it appears that both supply- and demand-side eﬀects lead SMEs to
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use less proportion of debt in the financing of their activity than predicted by tra-
ditional capital structure theories for large firms. Instead, they have to and choose
to use more internal funds. Although most of the discussion above refer to SMEs in
general, ‘small businesses are too heterogenous to be lumped into a single category’
(Ang 1991) and ‘the same influences that may cause diﬀerences between SMEs and
larger listed forms, may also aﬀect relationships within the SME group, due to wide
variation of sizes present’ (Cassar and Holmes 2003). We share this view and, there-
fore, in this paper we conjecture that the SME group is not homogeneous at all and
that the smaller size-based groups are not just scaled down versions of the others.
In particular, we test whether the seven factors listed in the previous section are
important for the capital structure decisions of the four size-based group of firms
considered in this paper and whether their influence is similar in all cases.10 This
hypothesis can be formulated as:
8. Determinants of debt are diﬀerent for micro, small, medium and large firms.
3.3 To issue or not to issue debt versus how much debt to
issue
The analysis of Panel B of Table 1 shows that 72.8% of the firms in our sample
have zero leverage ratios. Other studies have also documented that a substantial
proportion of firms follow a zero-debt policy. For example, Petersen and Rajan
(1994) report that 28% of corporations and 45% of noncorporations in their U.S.A.
sample do not have LTD and in the sample collected by Brounen, Jong and Koedik
(2005) 25% of U.K. firms and 29% of French firms have no LTD at all. Very recently,
Strebulaev and Yang (2007), based on accounting information from COMPUSTAT
relative to U.S.A. firms, report that, on average, in the sample period 1962-2003,
13.2% of firm-years have no LTD, from a minimum of 9.3% in 1979 to a maximum
of 23.7% in 2003. In their paper, which was suggestively entitled “The mystery of
zero-leverage firms”, these authors found that zero-leverage behaviour is a persistent
phenomenon and that standard capital structure theories are unable to provide a
reasonable explanation for it.
Panel B of Table 1 shows also that there is a clear size eﬀect on the probability of
a firm using LTD, with larger firms resorting to LTD more often than smaller firms:
the percentage of firms that do not have LTD is 88.7%, 76.8%, 51.2% and 40.6% for
10Note that size is included in two diﬀerent ways in our analysis, both as a quantitative variable
(sales) and as a nominal variable (size-based group of firms), since we are assuming that the eﬀects
of size, as measured by sales, on the capital structure of firms may vary depending on whether the
firm is in fact micro, small, medium or large-sized.
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the groups of micro, small, medium and large firms, respectively. In Petersen and
Rajan (1994), Brounen, Jong and Koedik (2005) and Strebulaev and Yang (2007)
it is also evident that larger firms tend to use LTD more frequently. This suggests
that the larger proportion of zero leverage ratios found in our case relative to the
studies cited in the precedent paragraph may be explained by the larger proportion
of SMEs (94.2%) in our sample and by the fact that, on average, Portuguese LEs
are smaller than their U.S.A., U.K. and French counterparts.
The same size eﬀect is apparent when we compare mean and median lever-
age ratios by category (panel C): typically, larger firms have larger leverage ratios.
However, when we limit our comparison to firms that have LTD (panel D), we find
contradictory results: once they decide and are able to use LTD, smaller firms seem
to use it in a larger proportion than larger firms. For each one of the six possible
pairs of size-based groups of firms, we tested the statistical significance of the diﬀer-
ences between: (i) the proportion of firms that use LTD in each category; and (ii)
the mean leverage ratios of each category considering only firms that do use LTD.
In both cases, the tests revealed significant diﬀerences at a 1% level for all the six
pairs of groups of firms.
Thus, firm size seems to aﬀect in an inverse way the decisions on: (i) to issue
or not to issue debt; and (ii) (for those firms that do decide to use debt) on how
much debt to issue. Although international evidence suggests that in most countries
leverage is strongly positively related to size, recent research provide some support
to our conjecture. Like us, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Strebulaev and Yang
(2007) found that while larger firms are more likely to have some debt, conditional
on having some debt, larger firms are less levered. The former authors found also
that excluding zero-debt firms from leverage regressions changes the sign of the
size coeﬃcient from positive to negative. Similarly, Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007)
argue that ‘the positive relationship (between firm size and leverage) is an artefact
of the presence of small unlevered firms in the economy. When we control for
unlevered firms, the relationship between firm size and leverage becomes slightly
but statistically significant negative’. Finally, Cassar (2004) found that firm size
aﬀects in opposite ways the use and magnitude of LTD by business start-ups.
Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007) put forward a theoretical explanation for these
opposite eﬀects of firm size on leverage. They conjecture that it is the presence of
fixed costs of external financing, and the consequent infrequent refinancing of firms,
that causes these diﬀerences between small and large firms, since the former are
much more aﬀected in relative terms. According to these authors: (i) small firms
choose higher leverage at the moment of refinancing to compensate for less frequent
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rebalancing, which explains why, conditional on having debt, they are more levered
than large firms; (ii) as they wait longer times between refinancings, small firms
have on average lower levels of leverage; and (iii) in each moment, there is a mass
of firms opting for no leverage since small firms may find it optimal to postpone
their debt issuances until their fortunes improve substantially relative to the costs
of issuance.
All the discussion above focus on the conflicting eﬀects of firm size over the use
and proportion of LTD but other standard determinants of leverage identified by
traditional capital structure theories may actually have the same double influence
on leverage. For example, we may conjecture that older small firms are more likely
to have access to and use LTD, as argued by the financing life-cycle approach, but,
at the same time, as claimed by the pecking-order theory, they tend to use it in
a lower proportion since, due to a large amount of accumulated retained earnings,
they usually need less external finance. Moreover, even when one variable has the
same type of eﬀects (positive/negative) over the use and proportion of debt, it is
still very likely that the magnitude of those eﬀects is diﬀerent for each decision.
Based on these findings and conjectures, it seems clear that using a simple model
for analyzing leverage ratios will not be the most appropriate choice in most cases.
Therefore, in the next section we develop an econometric model that recognizes
the possibility that the decisions on the use and proportion of LTD may be taken
independently and, hence, some factors may aﬀect in diﬀerent forms (at least in
magnitude) each decision. Basically, contrary to the traditional practice in the
capital structure empirical literature, we model separately the probability of a firm
using debt and the expected value of the proportion of debt used by a firm when it
does use debt. Our aim is to test the following hypothesis:
9. The mechanisms that determine whether or not a firm uses debt at all are
diﬀerent from the mechanisms that determine the proportion of debt used by
firms that do use debt.
To the best of our knowledge, only Cassar (2004) and Cook, Kieschnick and Mc-
Cullough (2004) have investigated a similar hypothesis and both of them found some
support to it. Cook, Kieschnick and McCullough (2004) found that the predictive
ability of a model that separates the two decisions were much larger than those of
standard models that force the explanatory variables to aﬀect in an identical man-
ner both decisions, while Cassar (2004), as already referred to above, found that, in
the case of LTD, the size of a firm, measured by the natural logarithm of its assets,
aﬀects in significant opposite ways each decision. The main diﬀerence between our
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approach and theirs is methodological since we use a diﬀerent econometric model to
analyze the second decision (Cassar 2004 uses a linear model and Cook, Kieschnick
and McCullough 2004 uses a model that requires more heavy assumptions than ours;
see the next section for details). Moreover, in contrast to them, we show how to
combine the results obtained in each part of the model in order to calculate the
overall (unconditional) eﬀect of each explanatory variable on the proportion of debt
used by all firms.
4 Econometric methodology
In this section we first discuss why, from a methodological point of view, standard
regression models should not be used for modelling leverage ratios, then we briefly
review Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) regression model for fractional data, and
finally we present the two-part fractional regression model developed in this paper.
4.1 Standard regression models
Typically, empirical studies of capital structure specify linear regression models to
explain observed leverage ratios, which are then estimated by least squares-based
(LS) methods using cross sectional or panel company data; see for example the recent
surveys by Frank and Goyal (2008) and Prasade, Green and Murinde (2005), which
summarize the main methodologies used in capital structure empirical research.
However, leverage ratios have two fundamental statistical properties that cannot be
ignored econometrically: (i) by definition, they are bounded between 0 and 1; and
(ii) many firms do not use debt in their financing. Therefore, since, under these
circumstances, the eﬀect of any explanatory variable cannot be constant throughout
its entire range, the linearity assumption
E (Y |X) = Xβ, (1)
where Y is the dependent variable (a leverage ratio), X denotes a matrix containing
all explanatory variables and β is the vector of variable coeﬃcients that we aim to
estimate, is unlikely to hold. Moreover, specification (1) cannot guarantee that the
predicted values of Y lie between 0 and 1 without severe constraints on the range
of X or ad hoc adjustments to fitted values outside the unit interval.
Alternatively, as a typical random sample of firms contains many firms that do
not use debt, some authors (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1995 and Cassar 2004) have
opted for using a tobit approach for data censored at zero. This model assumes a
15
nonlinear relationship between Y and X given by
E (Y |X) = Φ
µ
Xβ
σ
¶
Xβ + σφ
µ
Xβ
σ
¶
, (2)
where Φ (·) and φ (·) denote the standard normal distribution and density functions,
respectively, and σ is the standard deviation of the error term of the latent linear
model that implies (2). However, using the tobit to model leverage ratios suﬀers
also from some drawbacks. First, equation (2), despite being limited from below at
zero, still has no upper bound. Second, conceptually, as some authors argue (e.g.
Maddala 1991), the latent model underlying (2) is appropriate to describe censored
data in the interval [0,1] but its application to data defined only in that interval is
not easy to justify: zero leverage ratios are a consequence of individual choices and
not of censoring. Finally, the tobit model is very stringent in terms of assumptions:
the error term of the latent model has to be homoskedastic and to possess a normal
distribution. There are some modified tobit models that could be used (e.g. the
heteroskedasticity-robust tobit estimator used by Wald 1999 or the two-limit variant
of tobit employed by Johnson 1997 and Fluck, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen 1998 to take
care for both the lower and upper limits of the distribution of leverage ratios) but
none of them would solve simultaneously all the issues associated with the use of
tobit models.
Another alternative used in previous research (e.g. Jordan, Lowe and Taylor
1998) to model leverage ratios is the utilization of the logistic transformation
E (Y |X) = e
Xβ
1 + eXβ
, (3)
which is indeed a natural choice for modelling proportions since it ensures that 0 <
E (Y |X) < 1. However, instead of estimating (3) directly, which would require a
nonlinear technique such as nonlinear least squares (NLS), most authors prefer to
use LS to estimate the log-odds ratio model defined by
E
µ
log
Y
1− Y
¯¯¯¯
X
¶
= Xβ, (4)
which basically corresponds to the linearization of the equation that results from
solving Y = eXβ
±¡
1 + eXβ
¢
in order to Xβ. Again, a regression model defined by
(4) is not adequate to explain leverage ratios because the transformed dependent
variable is not well defined for the boundary values 0 and 1 of Y , requiring ad hoc
adjustments (such as adding an arbitrarily chosen small constant to all observations
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of Y ). Moreover, from (4) it would be very diﬃcult to recover E (Y |X) and, thus,
interpret the model parameters in terms of the leverage ratio, which would still be
our main interest.
4.2 Fractional regression model
As the correct specification of the conditional mean of Y is a crucial assumption
for the validity of any regression model, the evidence found in papers assuming
(1), (2) or (4) may be incorrect (to the best of our knowledge, in no case was that
assumption tested) and should be validated using suitable econometric models. One
of such models is the fractional regression model (FRM) developed by Papke and
Wooldridge (1996) to deal with dependent variables defined on the closed interval
[0,1]. In their model, they assume a functional form for Y that imposes the desired
constraints on the values of the dependent variable:
E (Y |X) = G (Xβ) , (5)
where G (·) is a known nonlinear function satisfying 0 < G (·) < 1. Papke and
Wooldridge (1996) suggest as possible specifications for G (·) any cumulative distri-
bution function. Therefore, the logistic function (3) is a possible choice for G (·).
However, instead of being first linearized as discussed above, the model defined by
(5) is now estimated directly using nonlinear techniques.
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) showed that, although consistent estimators for
β could be obtained by estimating (5) by NLS, it is more eﬃcient to assume a
Bernoulli distribution for Y conditional on X and estimate the parameters β in (5)
by maximizing the quasi-likelihood function:
LL (β) = y log [G (Xβ)] + (1− y) log [1−G (Xβ)] . (6)
Indeed, as the Bernoulli distribution is a member of the linear exponential fam-
ily, the resulting quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator for β will always be
consistent, regardless of the true distribution of Y conditional on X, provided that
(5) is indeed correctly specified (see Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon 1984 for de-
tails). Actually, as in no circumstances can the Bernoulli be the true conditional
distribution of leverage ratios, robust standard errors have to be used. In this paper
we compute them by applying Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) equation 9, which
merely assumes (5).11 Thus, similarly to the three regression models discussed in
11The fractional regression model that assumes a logistic specification for G (.) can be easily
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the previous section, the crucial assumption of the FRM is the correct formalization
of E (Y |X), which can be tested using the extension of the RESET test outlined in
Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
4.3 Two-part fractional regression model
Although the FRM (5) may be used to explain the behaviour of a dependent variable
characterized by a large number of zero values, theoretically, as discussed in section
3.3, it may be preferable to construct separate models to explain the decisions: (i)
to issue or not to issue debt; and (ii) (for those firms that do decide to use debt)
on how much debt to issue. Indeed, given that zero leverage ratios occur with too
large a frequency than seems to be consistent with a simple model, the factors that
explain the former decision may be not the same as those that aﬀect the latter
decision or their eﬀect may be diﬀerent. Therefore, in this section we extend Papke
and Wooldridge’s (1996) FRM and develop a two-part FRM (2P-FRM) that mirrors
this two-part decision process.12
The first part of our 2P-FRM governs participation, i.e. specifies a binary out-
come model to explain the probability of a firm choosing to use LTD or not. Define
Y ∗ =
(
0 for Y = 0
1 for Y ∈ (0, 1]
. (7)
Then,
Pr (Y ∗ = 1|X) = Pr (Y ∈ (0, 1] |X) = F (Xθ) , (8)
where θ is a vector of variable coeﬃcients and F (·) is the cumulative logistic or
normal distribution function. The resulting logit or probit model may be estimated,
as usual, by ML using the whole sample.
The second part of the 2P-FRM governs positive choices, i.e. the magnitude
of nonzero leverage ratios. In this case, a G (·) function similar to the one defined
above for the FRM is also a valid specification:
E (Y |X,Y ∈ (0, 1]) = G (Xγ) . (9)
computed in Stata using the following command line:
glm LR EV1 ... EVk , link(logit) family(binomial) robust
where LR denotes the leverage ratio and EVj , j = 1, ..., k are the explanatory variables. Stata
includes also alternative specifications for G (·).
12Two-part (or hurdle) models are relatively common in the econometric literature of count
data; see Mulhahy (1986) for a seminal paper.
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As for the simple FRM, G (Xγ) may be estimated by QML but now using only data
for firms with positive leverage ratios.
Noting that E (Y |X) may be decomposed as
E (Y |X) = E (Y |X,Y = 0) ·Pr (Y = 0|X)+E (Y |X,Y ∈ (0, 1]) ·Pr (Y ∈ (0, 1] |X) ,
and that the first term on the right-hand side of this expression is identically zero,
the 2P-FRM may be described simply by
E (Y |X) = E (Y |X,Y ∈ (0, 1]) · Pr (Y ∈ (0, 1] |X)
= G (Xγ) · F (Xθ) , (10)
where their two components are to be estimated separately. As γ and θ are not
required to be the same, this 2P-FRM allows the explanatory variables to influence
in independent ways the firm’s choice of using or not LTD and the firm’s choice of
LTD proportion, as Table 1 revealed that should be the case of Portuguese firms.
Moreover, comparing (5) and (10) shows that if the mechanisms governing both
decisions are indeed diﬀerent, the functional form of the conditional mean will be
aﬀected. Hence, neglecting the special nature of the zero leverage ratios is likely
to produce serious misspecification since the parameters β appearing in (5) are a
mixture of the parameters γ and θ in (10) and have no clear interpretation.
The crucial assumption for estimating both γ and θ consistently is again the cor-
rect formalization of E (Y |X) which, in turn, requires that both E (Y |X,Y ∈ (0, 1])
and Pr (Y ∗ = 1|X) are properly specified.13 In this paper we assume a logistic spec-
ification for both functions, that is:
E (Y |X) = e
X(γ+θ)
(1 + eXγ) (1 + eXθ)
. (11)
To test the assumption made for G (Xγ) we apply the same RESET test referred
to above, while to test the specification adopted for F (Xθ) we use Pagan and
Vella’s (1989) version of the RESET test and Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1984)
13Recently, Cook, Kieschnick and McCullough (2004) used also a two-part model to explain
capital structure choices. Their approach is similar to ours but diﬀer in two important aspects.
First, in the second part of the model, they assume a beta distribution for the conditional dis-
tribution of (the positive values of) Y given X and then estimate the parameters γ by ML. As
the beta distribution is not a member of the linear exponential family, in addition to the correct
specification of E (Y |X,Y ∈ (0, 1]) and Pr (Y ∗ = 1|X) required by our model, in their case it is also
essential that the true distribution of Y conditional on X is indeed the beta distribution. Second,
while we opted for using a two-part model in order to be able to test a specific hypothesis about
capital structure choices, they were forced to do so: the beta distribution can only be applied to
observations on the open interval (0,1).
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heteroskedasticity test.14
The information provided by the coeﬃcients obtained from estimating the 2P-
FRM can be used to estimate the eﬀect of a change in the explanatory variable Xj
on both the probability of using LTD,
∂ Pr (Y ∗ = 1|X)
∂Xj
= θj
eXθ
(1 + eXθ)2
, (12)
and, if the firm already uses LTD, on the proportion utilized:
∂E (Y |X,Y ∈ (0, 1])
∂Xj
= γj
eXγ
(1 + eXγ)2
. (13)
Moreover, from (10) or (11), we can also calculate the eﬀect of a change in Xj on
the LTD used by all firms:
∂E (Y |X)
∂Xj
=
∂G (Xγ)
∂Xj
F (Xθ) +G (Xγ)
∂F (Xθ)
∂Xj
(14)
= γj
eXγ
(1 + eXγ)2
eXθ
1 + eXθ
+ θj
eXθ
(1 + eXθ)2
eXγ
1 + eXγ
. (15)
Thus, the total change in LTD can be disaggregated in two parts: (i) the change in
LTD of those that already use LTD, weighted by the probability of issuing debt; and
(ii) the change in probability of using LTD, weighted by the expected value of LTD
among those that already use LTD. This decomposition is similar to that found by
McDonald and Moﬃtt (1980) for the tobit model.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Main findings
In Table 4 we report the empirical results obtained from the estimation of the two
models implied by the 2P-FRM (to save space, we do not report the coeﬃcients
estimated for the industry constant dummies). Considering first the empirical ad-
equacy of both models, it seems that they fit the data relatively well in all cases.
Indeed, the RESET test provides no evidence of functional form misspecification;
for the binary model, Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1984) test for the null hypoth-
esis of homoskedasticity is not significant; and the values found for the pseudo R2,
14In the former case we do not need to test for heteroskedasticity since regression models for
continuously measured proportions with a finite number of boundary observations are always het-
eroskedastic and the estimation method adopted, QML, has that into account.
20
although low, are usual in cross-sectional studies.
Table 4 about here
Relative to the decision of issuing debt or not, the estimates obtained for the
binary choice model indicate that the only variables which significantly influence
that decision for all the four groups of firms are PROFITAB and LIQUIDITY .
In all cases, the higher the profitability and the amount of liquid reserves of the
firm, the less its probability of using LTD. Clearly, as implied by the pecking-order
theory and in opposition to the other two capital structure theories considered in
this paper, all types of firms seem to prefer internal resources to external ones to
finance their activity.
On the other hand, as predicted by the three theories, we find positive rela-
tionships between the resort to LTD and the explanatory variables TANGIB and
SIZE, which are significant for most groups. Interestingly, the only group where
TANGIB does not aﬀect significantly the probability of firms raising debt is that
of micro firms, maybe because the most important source of collateral for micro
firms is certainly the private collateral provided by their owners (see inter alia Hall,
Hutchinson and Michaelas 2004). In contrast, only for micro firms is the variable
AGE important to explain that probability. Therefore, it seems that, due to the
informational opacity that characterizes most micro firms, lenders use AGE as a
measure of their reputation: older micro firms are more prone to use LTD because
they have better access to the debt market since their longer history of survival leads
lenders to trust them more, as predicted by the agency costs theory. Moreover, older
firms tend to have longer banking relationships and, hence, as argued by Berger and
Udell (1995), pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral. See
also Egeln, Licht and Steil (1997) and Levenson and Willard (2000), who found that
smaller and younger firms are less likely to receive outside financing, as claimed by
the financing life-cycle theory.
We find also a statistically significant positive eﬀect of GROWTH on the prob-
ability of medium and large firms using LTD, which, again, is in line with the
pecking-order theory and in opposition to the other two theories. With regard to
NDTS, contrary to the trade-oﬀ theory, in no case did we find a significant cor-
relation between this variable and the probability of using LTD. Finally, the joint
significance of the industry dummies for micro, small and medium firms indicates
that industry membership exhibits an important eﬀect on SMEs capital structure.
Considering now the results of the second part of our model, which are based only
on firms that do use LTD, we find that, as predicted by the pecking-order theory: (i)
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both PROFITAB and LIQUIDITY are negatively related to the relative amount
of LTD issued, although only the eﬀect of the former variable is significant; (ii)
GROWTH has a positive relationship with LTD, which is significant for small and
large firms; and (iii) AGE aﬀects negatively the proportion of LTD used in the
financing of smaller firms. Interestingly, note the opposite eﬀects that AGE has
over the two levels of the model estimated for micro and small firms (although in
some cases that eﬀect is not significant): on the one hand, older firms are more
prone to use LTD, for the reasons explained above; on the other hand, conditional
upon the decision/ability to issue debt, they use a lower proportion of LTD in the
financing of their businesses than younger firms. A possible reason for the latter
eﬀect is the accumulation of retained earnings over time by firms that are successful
enough to survive for a long time, as suggested (in general) by the pecking-order
theory. Indeed, part of those retained earnings may be used to repurchase some
debt.
Also in contrast to the results obtained for the first part of our 2P-FRM, we
find that (i) TANGIB does not aﬀect significantly the proportion of LTD used by
firms; (ii) only for large firms does NDTS seem to be an important determinant of
the capital structure, maybe because large firms have generally higher marginal tax
rates than smaller firms and, therefore, more tax deduction benefit of (debt and)
non-debt tax shields; and (iii) SIZE has a significant negative impact on the relative
amount of LTD used by small and medium firms. The latter eﬀect confirms recent
findings by Cassar (2004) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006), which, as argued by
Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007), see section 3.3, may be explained by the presence of
transaction costs in the issuance of debt, which may result in minimum lower bonds
in debt issued. Finally, we found again that the industry where micro and small
firms operate is an important factor in explaining their LTD policy decisions.15
Overall, the results reported in table 4 suggest that the determinants of LTD
for micro, small, medium and large firms diﬀer in some aspects. For example, we
find that AGE is an important determinant of the capital structure of micro and
small firms, while NDTS is important only for large firms. Even when the type
of relationship (positive/negative) is the same for all groups, it seems that there
are important diﬀerences in the magnitude of the coeﬃcients in some cases. To
formally test the hypothesis whether the same regression model describes in an
appropriate way the capital structure choices for all size-based group of firms, we
applied the Chow-type tests described in the Appendix. In Table 5 we report the p-
15In particular, we found that the LTD decisions of micro and small firms in the Construction
sector are significantly diﬀerent from those of their counterparts in other industries.
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values estimated for both parts of the model for the null hypothesis of no significant
diﬀerences between all the coeﬃcients relative to each pair of size-based groups of
firms.
Table 5 about here
Considering both parts of the model, we found significant diﬀerences in seven out
of the twelve cases analyzed, which suggests that, when analyzing capital structure
choices, three distinct size-based groups of firms should be considered (assuming that
the European Commission definitions are used): (i) micro firms; (ii) small firms; and
(iii) medium/large firms. Indeed, in no case did we reject the hypothesis of equality
of the coeﬃcients for the medium and large groups of firms, i.e. the determinants
of the financing decisions of medium firms seem to be more similar to those of large
firms than those of the other SMEs. This similarity between medium and large
firms may be the reason why some of the previous studies on capital structures did
not find significant diﬀerences between the financing decisions of SMEs and LEs:
according to our results, the inclusion of medium-sized firms in the SME group is
likely to diminish substantially the diﬀerences between SMEs and LEs in terms of
capital structure choice.
The results reported in Table 4 also suggest that, as assumed in this paper,
the main determinants of the probability of a firm using LTD are not exactly the
same as those of the proportion of LTD used. Indeed, given that, for some groups,
TANGIB, LIQUIDITY , AGE and NDTS are important only for one of the
decisions and SIZE and AGE aﬀect in opposite ways each decision, it seems that a
two-part model such as the 2P-FRM that we employed is in fact a better option for
explaining the capital structure of firms than standard one-part models. However,
based exclusively on the coeﬃcients reported in Table 4, we cannot know which is the
overall eﬀect of each variable on the proportion of LTD used by firms, especially for
the variables that have opposite eﬀects on the two parts of the model. For example,
do larger small and medium firms use more or less LTD on average? To answer
this question, in Table 6 we report the partial eﬀects estimated for each variable,
which are the averages of the partial eﬀects calculated for each firm in the sample.
We report three diﬀerent partial eﬀects: (i) the eﬀect on the probability of using
LTD (∆P1), which was defined in (12); (ii) the eﬀect on the proportion of LTD used
by firms that already use LTD (∆E1), defined in (13); and (iii) the eﬀect on the
proportion of LTD used by all firms (∆E), defined in (15). It is this last eﬀect that
gives the combined eﬀect of each variable on the unconditional proportion of LTD
used by firms.
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Table 6 about here
The total partial eﬀects reported in the column labelled ∆E show that, overall,
NDTS, PROFITAB and LIQUIDITY aﬀect negatively the proportion of LTD
used by firms, SIZE influences it positively, and the eﬀect of AGE and GROWTH
is approximately nil in all cases. For micro firms the overall eﬀect of TANGIB is
nil, while for the other size-based groups it is positive. Clearly, given the signs found
for PROFITAB and LIQUIDITY , the pecking-order theory seems to be the one
that best describes the capital structure of firms, as already suggested above. Note
the positive eﬀect of SIZE, which is consistent with previous empirical research
that do not use separate models for the use and proportion of debt.
5.2 Comparison with alternative models
In Table 7 we report the results obtained by considering two other formulations for
the capital structure decisions of firms: the simple linear model used by most of
the previous papers and a standard FRM that uses all observations to estimate a
single equation. As expected, the linear model is not at all adequate for modelling
capital structure choices. Indeed, the RESET test rejects the hypothesis of correct
functional form specification in three out of four cases and the estimated models
originate predictions outside the unit interval for all groups. In contrast, only in
one case (and only at the 10% level) the RESET test indicates that the functional
form used by the FRM is misspecified. This was also expected since, as we said
before, from an econometric point of view, the FRM is appropriate to deal with
fractional dependent variables characterized by a large number of zeros. The main
disadvantage of the FRM is that identified above: using this model, it is impossible to
quantify the diﬀerent, sometimes conflicting, impacts that each explanatory variable
has on the two sequential capital structure decisions made by firms.
Table 7 about here
Despite the clear econometric inappropriateness of the linear model, note that, in
terms of the significance of the variables, identical conclusions are achieved for both
one-part models. To be able to compare in terms of magnitude the results obtained
in each one of the three models estimated, in Table 8 we report again the total
partial eﬀects computed before for the 2P-FRM and present also those calculated
for the linear model (which assumes that they are constant for all individuals and,
hence, are simply given by the estimated coeﬃcients) and for the FRM (which were
calculated using an expression similar to (13) but based on the full sample and on
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the FRM estimates for β). In almost all cases the estimated sign of the relationship
between each explanatory variable and the proportion of LTD used by firms is the
same for all models. In contrast, the magnitude of the estimated eﬀects for each
model is somewhat diﬀerent in some cases, particularly for the group of micro firms,
where the linear model underestimates substantially the eﬀect of some variables,
namely PROFITAB, LIQUIDITY and SIZE. Note that this is precisely the
case where linear models are expected to be more inadequate since the number of
firms with zero leverage is very large.
Table 8 about here
Overall, the results obtained in this section suggest that, despite producing bi-
ased results, using simple linear models for explaining leverage ratios may still yield
useful results in the sense that the sign and significance of the parameters of the
model does not seem to be largely aﬀected. However, in case we are interested also
in the magnitude of the eﬀects of the explanatory variables or in the potentially dif-
ferent impacts that they have on the two sequential capital structure decisions made
by firms, then using linear models will rarely be the best option, as the RESET test
indicates in our case. As a minimum, empirical researchers should start to apply
and report the result of the RESET (or a similar) test in order to show how reliable
are their results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the leverage decisions of Portuguese firms in order to test the
following two hypotheses about which traditional theories of capital structure do
not provide clear answers: (i) the determinants of capital structure are diﬀerent for
micro, small, medium and large firms; and (ii) the factors that determine whether
or not a firm issues debt are diﬀerent from those that determine how much debt it
issues. To be able to test the second hypothesis, we developed a 2P-FRM, which
can be used to determine both changes in the probability of using LTD and changes
in the proportion of LTD used by firms that already use it. The former changes
are estimated using a binary choice model, while for the latter we use a fractional
regression model that takes into account the bounded nature of leverage ratios.
The results obtained with the proposed model are quite encouraging since all the
econometric tests applied provided no evidence of any type of model misspecification.
We found strong support for both hypotheses. On the one hand, for the four
diﬀerent size-based groups of firms considered in the paper we found diﬀerences
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in terms of magnitude, direction and significance of some regression coeﬃcients of
the diﬀerent capital structure determinants. Nevertheless, the eﬀects on leverage
found for PROFITAB (-), LIQUIDITY (-) and GROWTH (+) suggest that the
pecking-order theory may be more suitable to describe the capital structure choices
made by all size-based groups of firms. On the other hand, our empirical results
show that some variables, namely AGE and SIZE, may have opposite eﬀects on the
two levels of the model, while others are important only for one of the two financial
leverage decisions analyzed in the paper. Regarding SIZE, our results confirm
recent evidence by Cassar (2004), Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Kurshev and
Strebulaev (2007) that, conditional on having debt, firm size is negatively related
to the proportion of LTD used by firms. Another interesting result of the paper
is that older micro firms are more prone to use LTD, which may be explained by
Berger and Udell’s (1995) findings that, in the case of smaller firms, older firms
(with, presumably, longer banking relationships) pay lower interest rates and are
less likely to pledge collateral.
7 Appendix: Chow-type statistics for testing for
diﬀerences in regression functions across groups
In linear models, it is usual to apply the Chow statistic to test whether the same
regression model describes correctly the dependent variable for two specific groups
of individuals. In such a case, this test may be implemented as a simple F test for
the null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0, where δ is the vector of parameters associated with
the interaction terms d ·X of the equation
E (Y |X) = Xβ + (d ·X) δ,
where d is a dummy variable which takes on the value one for one group (e.g.
micro firms) and the value zero for other group (e.g. small firms). Under the null
hypothesis there are no significant diﬀerences between the two groups and the same
regression model may be used for both groups.
The extension of this test for the binary choice model of the 2P-FRM is straight-
forward since that model is estimated by ML. In addition to the model defined in
(8), Pr (Y ∗ = 1|X) = F (Xθ), we simply have to estimate the augmented model
Pr (Y ∗ = 1|X) = F [Xθ + (d ·X) δ]
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and apply a conventional likelihood-ratio test for H0 : δ = 0.
Similarly, for the FRM defined in (9), E (Y |X,Y ∈ (0, 1]) = G (Xγ), the alter-
native model is given by:
E (Y |X,Y ∈ (0, 1]) = G [Xγ + (d ·X) δ] .
However, as the model is estimated by QML and we have to use robust estimation
of the covariance matrix, a Chow-type test constructed along the lines of the robust
RESET test outlined in Papke and Wooldridge (1996) has to be used. See also
Wooldridge (2003, pp. 262-263).
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Table 1: Sample statistics
Micro Small Medium Large Total
Panel A: Distribution of sample by firm size # 1446 1951 1024 271 4692
% 30.8 41.6 21.8 5.8 100.0
Panel B: Firms with null leverage ratios # 1282 1499 524 110 3415
% 88.7 76.8 51.2 40.6 72.8
Panel C: Leverage ratios for the whole sample Mean 0.053 0.089 0.147 0.152 0.094
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000
Panel D: Leverage ratios for firms that use debt Mean 0.466 0.385 0.302 0.256 0.347
Median 0.432 0.355 0.284 0.242 0.316
Table 2: Explanatory variables
Attribute Proxy
Name Definition
1. Non-debt tax shields NDTS ratio between depreciation and earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation
2. Tangibility TANGIB sum of tangible assets and inventories, divided by total assets
3. Size SIZE natural logarithm of sales
4. Profitability PROFITAB ratio between earnings before interest and taxes and total assets
5. Expected growth GROWTH percentage change in total assets
6. Age AGE years since foundation
7. Liquidity LIQUIDITY sum of cash and marketable securities, divided by current assets
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the explanatory variables
Variable Micro Small Medium Large Total
NDTS Mean 0.866 0.802 0.809 0.902 0.829
Median 0.503 0.576 0.629 0.623 0.569
TANGIB Mean 0.355 0.420 0.466 0.443 0.411
Median 0.322 0.414 0.474 0.462 0.412
SIZE Mean 12.063 13.765 15.464 17.445 13.824
Median 12.080 13.715 15.446 17.406 13.736
PROFITAB Mean 0.075 0.062 0.055 0.051 0.064
Median 0.047 0.047 0.042 0.035 0.045
GROWTH Mean 17.547 12.979 9.294 7.451 13.263
Median 6.436 6.637 4.990 5.013 6.060
AGE Mean 16.172 19.820 27.331 34.203 21.166
Median 12.000 17.000 22.000 29.000 17.000
LIQUIDITY Mean 0.296 0.175 0.124 0.107 0.197
Median 0.192 0.103 0.059 0.053 0.104
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Table 4: Regression results
Part I: Binary model Part II: Fractional regression model
Micro Small Medium Large Micro Small Medium Large
NDTS -0.181 -0.037 -0.077 -0.147 0.110 0.033 -0.057 -0.208∗∗∗
(-1.39) (-0.89) (-1.34) (-1.46) (0.68) (1.01) (-0.99) (-3.03)
TANGIB 0.266 1.246∗∗∗ 1.736∗∗∗ 1.814∗∗ -0.238 -0.335 -0.150 0.246
(0.69) (4.33) (4.35) (2.31) (-0.70) (-1.40) (-0.59) (0.42)
SIZE 0.712∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.086 0.057 -0.164∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ 0.026
(7.85) (7.48) (4.75) (0.70) (0.72) (-2.80) (-2.91) (0.34)
PROFITAB -3.320∗∗ -4.069∗∗∗ -5.982∗∗∗ -4.943∗∗ -2.666∗∗ -1.699∗ -2.831∗∗∗ -5.468∗∗∗
(-2.35) (-4.02) (-4.87) (-2.12) (-2.12) (-1.90) (-3.22) (-2.92)
GROWTH -0.001 0.002 0.009∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.003 0.004∗∗ 0.004 0.009∗
(-0.49) (0.99) (2.91) (2.05) (1.38) (2.13) (1.47) (1.71)
AGE 0.020∗∗ 0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.009 -0.009∗∗ -0.001 0.002
(2.47) (1.20) (-0.16) (0.81) (-1.12) (-2.59) (-0.63) (0.50)
LIQUIDITY -1.141∗∗∗ -1.720∗∗∗ -2.306∗∗∗ -1.707∗ -0.414 -0.318 -0.407 -0.368
(-2.66) (-4.50) (-4.81) (-1.71) (-1.10) (-0.98) (-1.19) (-0.32)
CONSTANT -9.965∗∗∗ -7.523∗∗∗ -5.325∗∗∗ -1.194 -0.891 2.139∗∗ 1.890∗∗ -0.965
(-8.06) (-7.98) (-4.19) (-0.54) (-0.84) (2.42) (2.28) (-0.60)
Number of observations 1446 1951 1024 271 164 452 500 161
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.074 0.086 0.066 0.291 0.145 0.078 0.110
RESET test 0.505 0.203 0.916 0.809 0.411 0.135 0.333 0.726
Heteroskedasticity test 0.261 0.710 0.315 0.288 – – – –
LR/LM tests for
industry dummies 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.823 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.110 0.481
Notes: below the coeﬃcients we report t-statistics in parentheses; for the test statistics we report p-values; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ denote coeﬃcients or test statistics which are significant at 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively; for the binary model, the
joint significance of the industry dummies was tested using a standard LR statistic, while the pseudo R2 and the
RESET and heteroskedasticity tests were computed as described in McFadden (1974), Pagan and Vella (1989) and
Davidson and MacKinnon (1984), respectively; for the fractional model, the pseudo R2 was calculated as the correlation
between the predicted and the actual values of LTD, while the RESET and LM tests were implemented as described in
Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
34
Table 5: Chow-type statistics (p-values)
Part I: Binary model Part II: Fractional model
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Micro 0.008∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.184 0.018∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Small – 0.016∗∗ 0.177 – 0.512 0.049∗∗
Medium – – 0.895 – – 0.582
Notes: the Chow-type statistics were calculated as described in the
Appendix; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote test statistics which are significant at 1%,
5% or 10%, respectively.
Table 6: Partial eﬀects for the two-part fractional regression models
Micro Small Medium Large
∆P1 ∆E1 ∆E ∆P1 ∆E1 ∆E ∆P1 ∆E1 ∆E ∆P1 ∆E1 ∆E
NDTS -0.028 0.025 -0.004 -0.006 0.007 0.000 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 -0.031 -0.035 -0.025
TANGIB 0.042 -0.054 0.000 0.195 -0.075 0.053 0.308 -0.033 0.099 0.381 0.042 0.110
SIZE 0.112 0.013 0.055 0.074 -0.036 0.018 0.066 -0.034 0.013 0.018 0.004 0.006
PROFITAB -0.522 -0.607 -0.452 -0.636 -0.378 -0.327 -1.060 -0.626 -0.585 -1.039 -0.923 -0.712
GROWTH 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
AGE 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
LIQUIDITY -0.179 -0.094 -0.115 -0.269 -0.071 -0.116 -0.409 -0.090 -0.176 -0.359 -0.062 -0.115
Notes: ∆P 1 is the eﬀect on the probability of using long-term debt, ∆E1 is the eﬀect on the proportion of long-term debt used
by firms that already use it, and ∆E is the eﬀect on the proportion of long-term debt used by any firm; each eﬀect was calculated
as the average of the eﬀects computed for each firm in the sample using expressions (12), (13) and (15), respectively.
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Table 7: Regression results for the linear and fractional regression models
Linear model Fractional regression model
Micro Small Medium Large Micro Small Medium Large
NDTS 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.021∗∗∗ -0.173 -0.019 -0.088 -0.319∗∗∗
(-0.07) (-0.66) (-1.54) (-3.85) (-1.12) (-0.73) (-1.62) (-2.78)
TANGIB -0.017 0.055∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.124 0.037 0.740∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗ 0.987
(-1.05) (2.46) (2.81) (1.31) (0.11) (2.51) (2.85) (1.43)
SIZE 0.028∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.011 0.007 0.647∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.095 0.074
(6.67) (4.85) (1.64) (0.61) (6.67) (4.73) (1.61) (0.87)
PROFITAB -0.069∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗ -0.605∗∗∗ -4.942∗∗∗ -4.090∗∗∗ -5.707∗∗∗ -7.357∗∗∗
(-2.71) (-5.20) (-5.09) (-3.87) (-3.23) (-4.51) (-5.86) (-3.73)
GROWTH 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.001 0.003 0.008∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(-0.38) (1.63) (2.55) (2.32) (-0.43) (1.63) (3.17) (2.47)
AGE 0.001∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014∗ -0.002 -0.001 0.004
(1.78) (-0.28) (-0.40) (0.87) (1.65) (-0.36) (-0.24) (0.98)
LIQUIDITY -0.039∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.140 -1.011∗∗ -1.629∗∗∗ -1.911∗∗∗ -1.411
(-3.19) (-4.16) (-4.96) (-1.27) (-2.34) (-3.51) (-4.22) (-1.17)
CONSTANT -0.258∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ 0.022 0.091 -10.151∗∗∗ -5.916∗∗∗ -2.746∗∗∗ -2.363
(-5.10) (-2.63) (0.20) (0.41) (-7.83) (-6.24) (-3.00) (-1.35)
Number of observations 1446 1951 1024 271 1446 1951 1024 271
RESET test 0.000∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.316 0.375 0.065∗ 0.750 0.675
% of predictions outside
the unit interval 11.07 3.18 1.46 2.58 – – – –
Notes: below the coeﬃcients we report t-statistics in parentheses; for the test statistics we report p-values; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote coeﬃcients or test statistics which are significant at 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively; the RESET test applied to the
linear and fractional models was implemented as described in Ramsey (1969) and Papke and Wooldridge (1996),
respectively.
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Table 8: Total partial eﬀects
Micro Small Medium Large
LS FRM 2P-FRM LS FRM 2P-FRM LS FRM 2P-FRM LS FRM 2P-FRM
NDTS 0.000 -0.020 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.021 -0.031 -0.025
TANGIB -0.017 0.004 0.000 0.055 0.062 0.053 0.106 0.092 0.099 0.124 0.096 0.110
SIZE 0.028 0.076 0.055 0.022 0.024 0.018 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.006
PROFITAB -0.069 -0.577 -0.452 -0.228 -0.341 -0.327 -0.448 -0.585 -0.585 -0.605 -0.714 -0.712
GROWTH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
AGE 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LIQUIDITY -0.039 -0.118 -0.115 -0.093 -0.136 -0.116 -0.177 -0.196 -0.176 -0.140 -0.137 -0.115
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